Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

Rhonda Lynn Cameron Barton v. John Kimball
Barton : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dana D. Burrows; Attorney for Appellee.
Don R. Petersen and Leslie W. Slaugh; Howard, Lewis and Peterson; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Barton v. Barton, No. 991026 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2441

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RHONDA LYNN CAMERON
BARTON,
Petitioner-Appellant,

Case No. 991026-CA
Oral Argument
Priority 15

vs.
JOHN KIMBALL BARTON,
Respondent-Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGEMENT
OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS AND THE HONORABLE
RAY M. HARDING, JR.

Don R. Petersen and
Leslie W. Slaugh
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 E. 300 N.
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603
(801) 373-6345
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Dana D. Burrows
Attorney at Law
1149 West Center
Orem, UT 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Utah Court of ApP***6

JUL 2 7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

^

Julia D'Alesandro

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RHONDA LYNN CAMERON
BARTON,
Petitioner-Appellant,

Case No. 991026-CA
Oral Argument
Priority 15

vs.
JOHN KIMBALL BARTON,
Respondent-Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGEMENT
OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS AND THE HONORABLE
RAY M. HARDING, JR.

Don R. Petersen and
Leslie W. Slaugh
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 E. 300 N.
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603
(801)373-6345
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Dana D. Burrows
Attorney at Law
1149 West Center
Orem, UT 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND LAW

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

6

POINT 1
THE COURT EXERCISED PROPER JURISDICTION
A.

6

The Agreement Regarding a Special Master Set Out in
the Divorce Decree Had Not Been Met

6

B.

The PKPA Does Not Affect Jurisdiction in This Matter

8

C.

The Trial Court Exercised Appropriate Jurisdiction Per an
Agreement Between the California and Utah Courts

8

The Court Properly Ruled in This Matter

9

D.
POINT II

10

MRS. BARTON ACTED IN BAD FAITH REGARDING
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONTEMPT ORDER;
CONSEQUENTLY, THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED
TESTIMONY OFFERED TO JUSTIFY HER ACTIONS

10
i

POINT III

12

THE CONTEMPT FINDING WAS APPROPRIATE IN LIGHT
OF MRS. BARTON'S BLATANT DISREGARD FOR THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS

ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12

I

CONCLUSION,

14

ADDENDUM
A.
Addendum to Decree of Divorce, entered Dec. 22,1998.
B.
Transcript, Hearing, Ventura County, CA, Sept. 7,1999.
C.
Order on Order to Show Cause and Judgment, entered Aug. 12, 1999.
D.
Order for Sanctions, entered Nov. 5, 1999.

iii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited:
Kelly v. Dranev. 754 P. 2d 92 (Utah App. 1988)

13

Liska v. Liska. 902 P. 2d 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

8, 9

Marsh v. Marsh. 973 P. 2d 988 (Utah App. 1999)

1

Mellor v.Cook. 597 P. 2d 882 (Utah 1979)

11

Mvers v. Mvers. 768 P. 2d 979 (Utah App. 1989)

13

Otteson v. State. 945 P. 2d 170, 171 (Utah App. 1997)

7

Porco v. Porco. 752 P. 2d 365 (Utah App. 1988)

14

Rawlines v. Weiner. 752 P. 2d 1327, 1330-31 (Utah App) (Bench, J. Concurring), Cert,
denied, 765 P. 2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
12
Rehn v. Rehn. 974 P. 2d 306 (Utah App. 1999)

12

State ex rel. D.S.K. v. Kasper. 792 P. 2d 118 (Utah App. 1997)

9

State v. Sorenson. 617 P. 2d 333 (Utah 1980)

10,11

Thomas v. Thomas. 569 P. 2d 1119 (Utah 1977)

12

STATUTES AND RULES CITED
Utah Rules of Evidence 801(c)

'

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(a)

i
iv
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

The trial court did not err in its determination of contempt and sanctions nor did it
err in exercising jurisdiction in this matter as this proceeding is a matter of contempt
and sanctions and not one of custody.

The decision to hold a party in contempt rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will
not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's action is so unreasonable as to be classified as
capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of discretion. Marsh v. Marsh, 973 P. 2d 988 (Utah App.
1999). Here, the decision to hold Mrs. Barton in contempt was not done capriciously. Her refusal
to cooperate with the Special Master despite the provisions in the Divorce Decree and her failure to
appear at the August 11 hearing, despite being noticed of the hearing, demonstrates her wilful and
continuous disregard for the judicial process. Furthermore, there can be no argument that the court
abused its discretion as evidenced by the fact that Mrs. Barton was given time (60 days) to comply
with the court order before sanctions were imposed and yet, she—once again—wilfully ignored the
court order.
II.

The trial court did not err in exercising jurisdiction since Petitioner had already been
found in contempt and the trial court was only addressing the issue of sanctions.

Judge Harding made it clear that he would only entertain matters regarding contempt and the
1
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imposition of sanctions. Judge Harding said:
In regards to the makeup visitation I want the order to reflect
clearly that I do not believe I have jurisdiction further to enter
orders regarding makeup visitation, that my order in no way deals
with the makeup visitation to which Mr. Burrows' client may be entitled,
and that I'm referring that matter to the special master and court in
California for determination and adjudication." (Transcript, October
18 page 143).
The matter addressed before this court was one of contempt and sanctions and the trial court was
well within its powers to adjudicate it.
III.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its imposition of sanctions against
Petitioner due to Petitioner's wilful and continuous refusal to comply with court
orders.

The trial court inquired as to Petitioner's financial status in awarding Respondent fees and costs due
to Petitioner's wilful disobedience and disregard of court orders. The decision to hold Petitioner in
contempt was based on her continued refusal to cooperate in the judicial process. It was not done
capriciously or arbitrarily. Petitioner decided not to cooperate with the Special Master. Petitioner
decided not to attend the hearing in Utah and was, subsequently, found in contempt. The judge gave
her 60 days in which to remedy the situation and comply with the court order. Petitioner decided,
once again, to ignore the court order. Petitioner's disobedience and wilful disregard precipitated the
contempt order and the imposition of sanctions.
IV.

The trial court did not err in excluding hearsay testimony meant to justify Petitioner's
actions when evidence demonstrates Petitioner's knowingly and wilfully violated the
contempt order.
2
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Barker. Mr. Barton paid Dr. Barker's fees in its entirety to expedite the process. Mrs. Barton, on
the other hand, did little to cooperate with the Special Master and did little to facilitate Mr. Barton's
visitation with his children. After the visitation and non cooperation became unbearable, Mr. Barton
sought assistance from the courts. On July 19, 1999, Mr. Barton obtained an Order to Show Cause
regarding contempt which scheduled a hearing for August 11, 1999. An Affidavit filed by Mr.
Barton detailed his visitation problems with Mrs. Barton. Mrs. Barton did not appear at the hearing
but filed an Affidavit (Record 406-388) responding to the claims and making counter arguments.
Mrs. Barton also filed an Ex parte order in an attempt to have California take emergency jurisdiction.
This action was denied on all four (4) grounds raised by Petitioner.
At the August 11 hearing, Judge Lynn Davis found Mrs. Barton in contempt of court for
failing to "appear on this date after having been properly and personally served, and for her... failure
to comply with the decree or the addendum to the decree." (Transcript, August 11 page 31). Judge
Davis ordered Mrs. Barton to pay $1397.00 for travel, wage loss, and attorney's fees and costs.
Judge Davis reserved the issue of sanctions for contempt for 60 days in order to give Mrs. Barton
time to comply with the Divorce Decree.
Mrs. Barton, once again, tried unsuccessfully to transfer jurisdiction to California. On
September 7, 1999, Mrs. Barton was admonished by the Honorable Glen M. Reiser:
I think the Utah Court has jurisdiction at this point. But
they also have contempt powers, and I think its incumbent on
your client to recognize that. If she doesn't want to go to jail in
Utah she ought to think about that." (Transcript,
September 7 page 13).
Per the 60 day grace period, stemming from the August 11 hearing, a sanctions hearing was
held on October 18, 1999. Judge Harding found Mrs. Barton had not complied with the provisions
4
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outlined in her contempt hearing and sanctioned her with incarceration for two (2) days and imposed
fees and costs of $3,631.88. Prior to this, California and Utah courts conferred, transferring
jurisdiction to California with regards to all issues except contempt and sanctions. (Record 447).
To date, Mrs. Barton has not paid the monetary judgement. Mrs. Barton now brings this appeal.
This case is quite clear. Utah has jurisdiction over matters regarding contempt and sanctions and
properly imposed sanctions against Mrs. Barton for her contempt of court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah court exercised appropriate jurisdiction. The parties were, indeed, divorced in Utah
by bifurcated decree entered on April 9,1997. (Record 59-58) and Mrs. Barton moved to California
on or around August 15,1997. However, Mr. Barton remained domiciled in Utah but took extended
contract work in California in order to facilitate visitation without disruption in the children's lives.
The Addendum to the divorce decree provides that:
A.(iv) The Fourth District Court of Utah, State of Utah, shall
maintain jurisdiction of this case until a Special Master/Interventionist
in California is established and agreed upon between the parties.
The Special Master will act as a child advocate and an arbitrator on
behalf of the children and will be able to work with each parent to
improve the parties' post divorce relationship. (Record 323-322).
Here, the Special Master had been designated and Mr. Barton paid the fees and began cooperating
with him. Mrs. Barton, on the other hand, was not cooperating with the Special Master. She would
not return phone calls and she did not make appointments. In fact, it has been established that her
tone towards the Special Master was belligerent and non cooperative. The Special Master had been
designated, but arguably, Mrs. Barton's actions could be viewed as a direct rejection of his services.
In which case, the Special Master had not yet been "established and agreed upon by both parties"
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and Mr. Barton's attempt to enforce the divorce decree was properly heard by the Utah Courts.
The Federal Parental Kidnaping Act does not apply in this case since Mr. Barton was still
a Utah resident at the time of the contempt proceeding. The court, then, exercised appropriate
jurisdiction.
The court's rulings were appropriate. Judge Davis inquired as to Mrs. Barton's financial
condition. The judge inquired as to her salary, her support payments, and her monthly expenses
before making his decision. Mrs. Barton was allowed time to comply with the court order. She did
not comply with the court order. Mrs. Barton's wilful disregard of existing court orders precipitated
the judge's rulings. In light of Mrs. Barton's conduct and behavior, the ruling was appropriate. The
trial court also properly excluded testimony meant to justify Mrs. Barton's actions. The testimony
was excluded based on rules governing hearsay. Assuming arguendo that Mrs. Barton was allowed
to introduce hearsay evidence meant to establish some justification for her actions, she can only do
so by a showing of good faith. Mrs. Barton knowingly disregarded the court order. She attempted
to have California exercise emergency jurisdiction to avoid any punishment for her action. She
wilfully disregarded the contempt order and continues to attempt to shirk from accepting
responsibility for her actions. Due to Mrs. Barton's actions, the ruling to exclude hearsay evidence
was proper.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT EXERCISED APPROPRIATE JURISDICTION.
A.

The Agreement Regarding a Special Master Set Out in the Divorce Decree Had Not
Been Met.

6
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4

First and foremost, it has been established that the proceedings that have led to this appeal
were for contempt and sanctions and not regarding custody. The Addendum to the Divorce Decree
provides that:
A.(iv) The Fourth District Court of Utah, State of Utah, shall
maintain jurisdiction of this case until a Special Master/Interventionist
in California is established and agreed upon between the parties.
The Special Master will act as a child advocate and an arbitrator on
behalf of the children and will be able to work with each parent to
improve the parties' post divorce relationship. (Record 323-322).
A Special Master had been designated but was not established and was not functioning in working
"with each parent to improve the parties' post divorce relationship" as indicated in the Addendum.
Arguably, the Special Master had not been established and agreed upon by both parties since Mrs.
Barton was not cooperating with him. Appellant argues: "A court's initial inquiry should always be
to determine whether it has jurisdiction to determine a controversy." (Appellants Brief, page 11
quoting Otteson v. State, 945 P. 2d 170, 171 (Utah App. 1997). At the August 11 hearing, Judge
Davis did inquire as to whether Utah had jurisdiction. After reading relevant portions of the Divorce
Decree, the judge said:
If it says Utah shall maintain jurisdiction of this case
until a special master interventionist in California is established,
and that in fact has been established or to have been established then
it was, I don't know whether it was the judges belief that once that
occurred Utah has no further jurisdiction." (Transcript,
August 11, 1999 page 8-9).
The argument was raised that in essence the Special Master has not been established because in Mrs.
Barton's correspondence she has said that she didn't acknowledge the Special Master. She even
attempted to have California take emergency jurisdiction and California denied that request. Why
would she do that if she believed jurisdiction had already transferred to California?
7
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After the

judge's inquiry, the judge decided Utah maintained jurisdiction to hear the matter. Mr. Barton
brought this action in a Utah court because the provisions of the Divorce Decree, specifically the
provision regarding cooperation with the Special Master, were not being met. Having properly
established jurisdiction, the court exercised appropriate jurisdiction in finding Mrs. Barton in
contempt of court for failure to appear at the hearing and for failure to comply with the decree or the
Addendum to the divorce Decree.
B.

The PKPA Does Not Affect Jurisdiction in This Matter.

The Parental Kidnaping Protection Act (PKPA) provides for jurisdiction. In this case, the PKPA
does not apply since Mr. Barton had not moved from Utah. At the time of the contempt hearing, Mr.
Barton did work in California but his primary place of residence was Utah. He owned property in
Utah and not in California. He paid his insurance in Utah. All in all, Mr. Barton was a Utah
resident. Liska v. Liska, cited in Appellant's brief, states "Jurisdiction remain in the decree state as
long as one parent continues to reside in the original state and maintains some contact with the
child." 902 P. 2d 644 (Utah App. 1995) quoting Rawlings v. Weiner. 752 P. 2d 1327,1330-31 (Utah
App.) (Bench, J. Concurring), cert, denied, 765 P. 2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
Utah retained jurisdiction. Even if the PKPA does preempt State law, it does not apply here
since Mr. Barton was a Utah resident at the time of the contempt proceeding. Utah Code Ann. 7845c-3 is not disturbed. All of the cases cited in Appellant's brief discuss jurisdiction when all parties
have moved from the decree state. This is simply not the case here. The PKPA does not apply and
the Utah Court exercised appropriate jurisdiction in this matter.
C.

The Trial Court Exercised Appropriate Jurisdiction Per an Agreement Between the
California and Utah Courts.
i
8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah had jurisdiction to hear the contempt and sanctions proceedings per an agreement
between the Utah and California courts. On September 28,1999, Commissioner Pattie in California
and Judge Ray M. Harding in Utah conferred regarding jurisdiction. The courts agreed:
The [Utah] Court rules that it will hear the contempt matter currently
set for October 18, 1999, at 3 PM. All other issues, including custody
and visitation, are to be heard by the California court. (Record 447).
There can be no question of jurisdiction. In Liska v. Liska, the court states:
Until Utah declined to exercise jurisdiction, the Colorado court was
without power to unilaterally assume jurisdiction over this case, unless
it did so on an emergency basis. 902 P. 2d 644 (Utah App. 1995)
quoting State ex. rel. D.S.K. v. Kasper, 792 P. 2d 118. 123
(Utah App. 1990).
Despite Mrs. Barton's attempts, California would not take emergency jurisdiction in this matter.
Mrs. Barton cannot use the legal system to avoid being held responsible for her disobedience in
complying with court orders.

D.

The Court Properly Ruled in This Matter.

The court did make inquiries as to whether the Special Master had been established. The
court also heard testimony as to the failure on the part of Mrs. Barton to cooperate with the Special
Master. The court heard testimony of Mrs. Barton's failure to comply with visitation provisions in
the Divorce Decree. The court also heard testimony of Mrs. Barton's rejection of the Special Master.
The court also heard testimony that Mr. Barton was finding it impossible to enforce the Divorce
Decree due to Mrs. Barton's wilful disregard for its provisions. The court also noted Mrs. Barton's
failure to appear for the hearing and was aware that she had attempted to have California take

9
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emergency jurisdiction in this matter. With all of this information in hand, the court properly ruled
in this matter.
POINT II
MRS. BARTON ACTED IN BAD FAITH REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH THE
CONTEMPT ORDER AND THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED TESTIMONY
MEANT TO JUSTIFY HER ACTIONS.
On August 11,1999, Mrs. Barton was found in contempt of court. At the hearing, the judge
found her
in contempt of court as it relates to her failure to appear on this date
after having been properly and personally served, and for her...failure
to comply with the decree or the addendum to the decree. (Transcript,
August 11 page 31).
In an attempt to afford Mrs. Barton time to remedy the situation and avoid a penalty, the judge said
that he would
reserve the issue of...a penalty or, the imposition of incarceration pending
a review of her compliance with the order. It won't purge it but...I will
hold it in reserve for 60 days...(Transcript, August 11 page 32).
Since the order was issued, Mrs. Barton has done nothing to comply with it. In fact, she has done
everything in her power to keep the children from Mr. Barton and has not cooperated with the
Special Master. At the contempt hearing held on October 18, 1999, Mrs. Barton attempted to
explain why she had not appeared at the August 11 hearing and why she has continued to deny
visitation to Mr. Barton. Much of this explanation was stating advice supposedly given her by
others, namely her California counsel. Judge Harding appropriately denied such testimony as
hearsay. Utah Rules of Evidence 801 (c) states: hearsay is limited to statements "offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Appellant cites State v. Sorenson in arguing the evidence
i
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should have been admitted. State v. Sorenson states:
When an out of court statement is offered simply to prove that it was
made, without regard to whether it is true, such testimony is not proscribed
by the hearsay rule." 617 P. 2d 333 (Utah 1980).
Sorenson further states, "Evidence of a statement by a third person is therefore admissible,
irrespective of the fact that it was made out of court, if it is offered to support a defense of good
faith." In the case at hand, Mrs. Barton cannot make a good faith defense. The evidence justifying
Mrs. Barton's actions was properly excluded since her actions prior to the contempt hearing and after
the hearing, demonstrate she clearly had no intention of complying with the divorce decree or the
contempt order. Mrs. Barton comes to the table with unclean hands. She is seeking to have her
actions made in bad faith explained away by introducing hearsay evidence that is only admissible
to support a good faith defense. This course of action was properly not allowed by the Judge
Harding. Mrs. Barton's actions prior to and after the contempt hearing demonstrate her hostility
towards Mr. Barton and her desire to make visitation and communication with the children difficult,
if not impossible, for him.
Mellor v. Cook also cited in Appellant's brief discussed the exclusion of testimony
demonstrating reliance on advice of counsel, where defendant manifested an attitude of knowing and
wilful disobedience of the court order. 597 P. 2d 882 (Utah 1979). Once again, Mrs. Barton
knowingly disregarded the court order. Mrs. Barton knew the duty imposed upon her by the court
order as evidenced by the ex parte orders requesting emergency jurisdiction which she filed in
California prior to the August 11 hearing. Mrs. Barton was not prejudiced by the exclusion of
testimony justifying her actions because she wilfully and knowingly violated the court order.
Moreover, she has no good faith defense as evidenced by her actions warranting the contempt
11
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hearing. The exclusion of such testimony did not prejudice Mrs. Barton in any way. Rehn v. Rehn,
974 P. 2d 306 (Utah App. 1999).
POINT III
THE CONTEMPT FINDING WAS APPROPRIATE IN LIGHT OF MRS. BARTON'S
BLATANT DISREGARD FOR THE JUDICIAL PROCESS.
In Thomas v. Thomas. 569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977), it states: "When a proper order or
judgment has been made, one who stands in wilful defiance or disobedience thereof may be found
in contempt of court and punished by imprisonment." Mrs. Barton wilfully defied the court order
and was, subsequently, found in contempt. Further, Judge Davis afforded her 60 days in which to
comply with the court order. Once again, Mrs. Barton refused to comply. Appellant contends that
neither Judge Davis nor Judge Harding inquired as to Mrs. Barton's finances and ability to pay. This
contention is incorrect. Judge Harding went into some detail regarding Mrs. Barton's salary, living
expenses and support payments (See, Transcript, October 18 page 22-23). Furthermore, Appellant
attempted to offer testimony of a recent bankruptcy and the financial conditions that led to that
bankruptcy to which Judge Harding responded:
...you probably know this court well enough to know that's not
going to make a difference in my decision. It may feel good to your
client to be able to state that but it's not going to make any
difference to me. (Transcript, October 18 page 52).
Appellant's attorney then stated:
No. And, we only bring that out for the purpose, Your Honor, of
showing what her financial condition is. (Transcript, October 18 page 52).
To which Judge Harding responded, "Well, it doesn't show...I've ruled." (Transcript, October 18
page 52-53). As demonstrated, inquiries were made into Mrs. Barton's ability to pay. Appellant
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also argues that the court placed Mrs. Barton in an impossible situation. "If she failed to pay Mr.
Barton, she would be in continued contempt. If she failed to pay the Special Master, she would be
found in contempt for failing to cooperate with the Special Master." (See, Appellant's Brief, page
16). This statement is also incorrect. Mr. Barton pre-paid the Special Master start-up fees to allow
the Special Master to begin working with both Mr. and Mrs. Barton. To date, Mrs. Barton has not
paid her portion of the fees. Appellant's argument that she is unable to incur the cost of the Special
Master is an attempt to shift the focus from being unwilling to pay to being unable to pay. Appellant
is attempting to extract sympathy for her position and cloud the issue of her wilful disobedience of
the court order.
A contempt finding was proper in this case considering Mrs. Barton's actions. The court
may find a party in contempt if there is a continued disregard of court orders. Kelly v. Dranev
established that contempt may be found when one party exhibits a "consistent refusal to follow the
direct court order." 754 P. 2d 92,95 (Utah App. 1988). Had Mrs. Barton put forth every reasonable
effort to comply with the court order and still failed to do so, she may not be guilty of contempt on
account of that failure. Myers v. Myers, 768 P. 2d 979 (Utah App. 1989). Nevertheless, this was
not the case with Mrs. Barton who has made no visible attempt to comply with the court order-even
after being found in contempt of court. Prior to being served notice of the August 11 hearing, Mrs.
Barton had written to Mr. Barton's attorney wherein she states she was "agreeable to John's request
to make up visitation." (Transcript, October 18 page 119). Now, when she was served with the
August 12 order, she still did nothing to allow visitation. To date, Mrs. Barton still has not made
an effort to comply with the court order and this appeal is yet another way to avoid her
responsibilities.
13
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Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows the court to award attorney's
feels and costs as a sanction for a frivolous appeal or for delay. In Porco v. Porco, 752 P. 2d 365
(Utah App. 1988) this court ruled sanctions should be imposed for a frivolous appeal when:
An appeal is obviously without merit and has been taken with no
reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and results in delayed
implementation of the judgement of the lower court; increased
costs of litigation; and dissipation of the time and resources of the
law court.
The Porco court so ruled even though it "recognize[d] that sanctions for frivolous appeals should
only be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous
lower court decisions."
Here, Respondent seeks an award of his reasonable attorneys fees incurred in this appeal
under Rule 33 (a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as this appeal is frivolous as defined
by Porco. Under this rule, Respondent seeks either the entire amount of his reasonable fees or such
amount as may be determined to have been incurred for that portion of the appeal that this court
finds to be frivolous, if the court finds the appeal only partially frivolous.
CONCLUSION
The trial court exercised appropriate jurisdiction since this was a contempt and sanctions
issue and not one of custody. Furthermore, the California and Utah courts agreed upon jurisdiction
for contempt. The Parental Kidnaping Protection Act does not apply to matters of contempt and
should, therefore, be disregarded.

Moreover, the decision to exclude hearsay evidence was

appropriate as no good faith defense can be asserted to justify Mrs. Barton's actions. Mrs. Barton

14
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wilfully refused to comply with the court order and was not prejudiced by the judge's decision to
exclude the testimony. Further, Respondent should be awarded fees and costs as Appellant is filing
a frivolous appeal and for delay.
The judgement of the trial court should not be reversed.

DATED this "Zi^day of July 2000.

DANA D. BURROWS
Attorney for Respondent-Appellee
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^ - 5 ^ ** l

DANA D. BURROWS - 5045
Attorney for Respondent
1149 West Center
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700

^

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RHONDA LYNN CAMERON,
BARTON,

ADDENDUM TO DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.
JOHN KIMBALL BARTON,

Civil No. 954400090

Respondent.

Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr.

The above-entitled matter having come before the court by way of Petitioner's Complaint for
Divorce and the parties having entered into a stipulation, which stipulation is approved by the court
and the court being fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now makes the ADDENDUM TO DECREE OF DIVORCE AS FOLLOWS:
ADDENDUM TO DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

The parties were previously divorced on April 9, 1997 after the court entered an order

granting bifurcation allowing the Respondent to proceed with the divorce with all remaining issues
reserved for trial.
2.

The parties have entered into a stipulated agreement incorporating:
A.

the terms and conditions of Dr. Jay Jensen's custody evaluation and

addendum dated August 13, 1997 and October 18, 1997, respectively, and

1
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child advocate and an arbitrator on behalf of the children and will be able to work
with each parent to improve the parties' post divorce relationship.
v.

The children should maintain their residence with their mother in the

state of California. Consideration should be given to maintaining an area in which
to live so that the children's relationship with their father is not compromised by
frequent moves by the mother.
vi.

Mr. Barton should maintain child oriented visitation with his children.

He should sustain frequent contact with them, but do so respecting the children's
developing interests. For instance, on visitation weekends where a child has a
scheduled soccer game he should facilitate the child's and his own attendance to the
game. In this regard, Petitioner should take care not to schedule activities which
compete with the children's time with their father.
vii.

Pursuant to (30-3-33) Of Utah statute the following is agreed:
a.

Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make

the child available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings,
family reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies and other
significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which
may inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule.
b.

The custodial parent shall have the child ready for visitation

at the time he is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or
shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the time
he is returned.
c.

The court (including the Special Master) may make alterations
3
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to.

than surrogate care and the court (including the Special Master) shall
encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if
willing and able, to provide child care.
k.

The custodial parent shall provide all surrogate care providers

with the name, current address and telephone number of the non-custodial
parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current
address and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court
(including the Special Master) for good cause orders otherwise.
I.

Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major

religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a
religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the right
to be together with the child on the religious holiday.
B.

Unless, and until, modified by the Special Master, Mr. Barton should

maintain Utah Statutory Visitation with the children expanded during the alternating
weekends in lieu of any midweek visit to commence on Thursday at the conclusion of school
(or at the same time when school is not in session) with the pick-up to occur at the school,
and/or preschool, and run through Monday morning when school recommences with the
drop-off to occur at the school and/or preschool. When school is not in session, the same
visitation is to be maintained with pick-up and drop-off to occur at another arranged location.
The Petitioner will notify the Respondent at least fifteen (15) days in advance of any change
in school, or preschool location.
i.

Alternating weekends, as defined above, beginning on the first

weekend after the entry of the decree and continuing each year;
5
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until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday;
f.

Veteran's Day holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before

the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and
g.

The first portion of the Christmas school vacation (which term

means the time period beginning when the child gets out of school for the
Christmas school break until the time the child returns to school after the
school break, except for Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and the New Year's
Day), plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m., so long as the
entire holiday is equally divided;
vi.

In years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled

to the following holidays:
a.

Child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3:00 p.m.

until 9:00 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other
siblings along for the birthday;
b.

New Year's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the

holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;
c

President's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the

holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday;
d.

July 4th beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday

until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday;
e. .

Labor Day Beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday at

7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
7
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parent;
b.

Two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial

c.

and the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for

parent;

the custodial parent consistent with these guidelines;
xii.

The custodial parent shall have an identical two week period of

uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for the
purposes of vacation;
xiii.

If the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's

extended visitation shall be one-half of the vacation time for year-round school
breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits;
xiv.

Notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child

shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and
xv.
C.

Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours.

A neutral site for pick-up and drop-off of the children should be established,

if necessary. If the children transition from parent to school, pick-up and drop-off between
parents will be reduced. However, during those times when school is not in session, an
additional neutral site should be selected with pick-up and drop-off times to be the same as
when the children are in school.
i.

Given the young ages of the children, there are a number of strategies

that can be used to help them maintain a sense of constancy and to help maintain the
relationship with their father as follows:
a.

Freedom with telephone contact, letters, cards, etc., between
9
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5.

The Special Master may make orders resolving conflicts between the Petitioner and

the Respondent which do not affect the court's exclusive jurisdiction to determine fundamental
issues of custody and visitation. Each party specifically agrees that the Special Master may make
decisions regarding possible conflict they may have. The Special Master shall have the authority 1)
to enforce the terms of this agreement, 2) to expand the Respondent's rights of visitation, and 3) to
resolve disputes between the parties regarding the following issues:
A.

The decision making on behalf of the parties' minor children that would
normally be made by the parties and articulated in a parenting plan.
The joint decision making between the parties and when and if it should be
commenced and a parenting plan to implement it. (See 3-A of this agreement)

C.

The issue of whether or not the Petitioner shall provide the Petitioner's street
address to the Respondent is reserved for determination by the Special
Master.
The issue of the religious upbringing of the children is reserved for
determination by the Special Master including:

E.

i.

baptism and religious training

ii.

church attendance

Hi

priesthood ordinations

How to arrange the transportation between the parties for visitation including
how to allocate the costs of transportation and the responsibility for
participating in the transportation.

F.

Where the pick-up and drop-off of the children shall take place.

G.

The grandparent's and extended family's involvement with the exchange and
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children in year round school, is reserved for determination by the Special
Master.
O.

The issue of resolving, in accordance with this agreement, visitation
scheduling conflicts that may arise between the parties shall be addressed by
the Special Master if there is a dispute between the parties.

P.

The issue of resolving hinderance of visitation, and/or communication via
phone, mail, and/or email shall be addressed by the Special Master if there is
a dispute between the parties.

Q.

The issue of whether or not the Respondent is current on his child support
obligation to allow the Respondent to claim the minor children as
dependents, as set forth in this agreement, shall be addressed by the Special
Master if there is a dispute between the parties.

R.

The issue of tax neutrality, as set forth in this agreement, for tax years 1996
& 1997, as established in this agreement, shall be addressed by the Special
Master if there is a dispute between the parties.

S.

The issue of payment of capital gains obligations, as set forth in this
agreement, as well as any unforeseen areas of conflict regarding tax liabilities
that may arise between the parties, shall be addressed by the Special Master
if there is a dispute between the parties.

T.

The issue of dividing the retirement, pension or profit sharing plan shall be
addressed by the Special Master.

U.

The issue of alternating the pre-Christmas break weekend visitation to allow
the parent with the second half of the Christmas break to spend the weekend
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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9.

It is reasonable and proper that the Respondent shall pay child support to the

Petitioner in the amount of $1,300.00 per month for July, August and September of 1998.
Commencing in October of 1998 and onward it is reasonable and proper that the Respondent shall
pay child support to the Petitioner in the amount of $1,075.00 per month with one-half due on or
before the 5th and one-half due on or before the 20th of each month.
10.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.10, when the oldest of the children

becomes 18 years of age or is graduated from High School during the child's normal and expected
year of graduation, whichever occurs later, the base child support award is automatically reduced to
reflect the lower base combined child support obligation shown in the Utah Child Support Table for
the remaining number of children due child support.
11.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.11, the Respondent shall be entitled to

a fifty percent 50% abatement in child support when the Respondent has the children with him for
twenty-five (25) out of thirty (30) consecutive days. Normal visitation and holiday visits to the
custodial parent during said period of time shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive
day requirement.
12,

If the custodial parent desires to relocate more than just a few blocks, sixty (60) days

notice of the intent to move shall be given, which would be communicated through the Special
Master if the parties are unable to communicate directly. If a dispute over the move arises, said
dispute shall be addressed by the Special Master.
13,

It is reasonable and proper that the Respondent shall pay alimony to the Petitioner for

July, August and September of 1998 in the amount of $200.00 per month, "The Respondent's
alimony obligation to the Petitioner shall forever terminate from October of 1998 onward.
14,

It is reasonable and proper that each party be responsible for one-half of the
15
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divided profits of $31,500.00 that each party received and shall hold the other party harmless there
from.
18.

During the course of the marriage the parties acquired debts and obligations, which

debts and obligations shall be divided as follows:
A.

To the Petitioner:
i.

B.

C.

Petitioner's student loans after separation in September of 1995;

To the Respondent:
i.

The cost for the storage unit of $2,250,

ii.

Marital debt obligations of:
a.

Credit card debt totalling $11,310,

b.

Respondent's remaining student loans of $10,760;

The remaining jointly incurred debts of the marriage prior to separation, if

there are any outstanding, shall be divided equally and the parties shall otherwise hold each
other harmless there from.
D.

Each party shall be responsible for their own debts and obligations incurred

subsequent to the parties' separation, which separation occurred in September of 1995.
E.

The costs of the custody evaluation shall be permanently divided as

temporarily divided by the court and paid by the parties.
F.

Each party shall hold the other party harmless from the debts that they have

assumed as set forth above.
19.

It is reasonable and proper that the parties divide the dependency exemptions for the

children as follows:
A.

For the tax years 1996 and 1997, each of the parties claimed the parties' three
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accident, eye care and orthodontia coverage that the Respondent is presently maintaining, if
any, through July of 1998 under the Cobra plan.
B.

The Petitioner shall maintain health, dental, accident, eye care and

orthodontia coverage on behalf of the children from September 1, 1998 and onward. The
Petitioner states that the Petitioner will have no difficulty nor limited coverage because of
pre-existing conditions.
C.

The Respondent may maintain additional health, dental, accident, eye care

and orthodontia coverage on behalf of the minor children, as secondary insurance, if it is of
benefit to the children and is economically feasible taking into consideration the monthly
premium, with the Petitioner being responsible for one-half of the children's portion of the
monthly premium. Irrespective of whether or not the Respondent maintains said secondary
insurance coverage, the Respondent shall be responsible for no more than one-half of the
remaining reasonable and necessary health, dental, accident, eye care and orthodontia costs
incurred on behalf of the minor children, if any, that are not covered by the Petitioner's
primary insurance including the children's portion of the monthly premium of the Petitioner's
primary coverage.
21.

The Petitioner alleges that because of treatment on Jacob's eye that there is a bill for

$3,000.00. Respondent shall be responsible for one-half of the bill of up to $3,000.00 with the
Respondent's one-half maximum being $1,500.00 subject to the Petitioner providing prompt
documentation.
22.

If medical, dental, orthodontia, eye care, or accident treatment on behalf of the

children is of a non-emergency nature, the Petitioner is directed to wait until the Petitioner's coverage
on the children commences on September 1, of 1998.
19
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incurred in pursuing the divorce action and shall further be responsible for 33% of the Petitioner's
attorney's fees in the amount of $3,547.00.

21
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ORIGINAL
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
%

FOR THE COUNTY OF VENTURA

COURTROOM S-3

HON. GLEN M. REISER, JUDGE

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

)

RHONDA LYNN CAMERON BARTON

)

Petitioner,

)

and

No. SD 022288

JOHN KIMBALL BARTON,
Respondent.

)
)

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Tuesday, September 7, 1999

APPEARANCES:
For Petitioner:

JOHN CASTELLANO
Attorney at Law

For Respondent:

SALLY DICHTER
Attorney at Law

Reported by:

GINA M. CURRIE, CSR 842 9
Official Court Reporter
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1
1

SIMI VALLEY, CALIFORNIA; TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 199 9

2

A.M. SESSION

3

--00O00--

4
5

THE COURT:

6

MR. CASTELLANO:

7

Barton versus Barton.
Good morning, your Honor.

John Castellano, from Richard Ross Associates,

8

on behalf of the plaintiff, Rhonda Barton, who is not in

9

court today.

10

THE COURT:

Mr. Castellano, welcome.

11

MS. DICHTER:

Sally Dichter, D-i-c-h-t-e-r, specially

12

appearing for Mr. Barton for the sole purpose of contesting

13

the subject matter, as well as other jurisdiction of the

14

Court, although I think, for purposes of this ex parte, the

15

only subject matter is jurisdiction.

16
17

THE COURT:

Ms. Dichter, good morning.

Well, I read this file, such as it is, and I'm

18

still a little -- I'm not confused as to what's in the file.

19

I'm confused as to what the current status quo is with

20

respect to where the children are.

21

MR. CASTELLANO:

Actually -- Well, the plaintiff --

22

It's a little confusing, because the plaintiff has a

23

Complaint, too.

24

THE COURT:

Petitioner.

25

MR. CASTELLANO:

26

modify a Utah decree.

27

divorce case, as well.

28

THE COURT:

It's actually to establish and
She is the petitioner in the Utah

I don't understand what you just said.
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2
1

MR. CASTELLANO:

2

children are with the mother.

.3

THE COURT:

4

MR. CASTELLANO:

5

THE COURT:

6

Okay.

As to the status quo, the

They are with the mother?
Yes.

Even though the Utah order says four

weeks to the father?

7

MR. CASTELLANO:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. CASTELLANO:

That's right.

Okay.

Why is that?
Well, your Honor, there's - - a t the

10

same time that the order says that Mr. Barton shall have

11

visitation with them from August 16 to September 13, it also

12

instructs Mrs. Barton to immediately contact --

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. CASTELLANO:

15
16

The special master.

Right.

- - t o resolve the custody disputes

in the case.
THE COURT:

Right.

And I have Dr. Cole's report,

17

so -- but - - S o why are the kids with their mom, if there's

18

a court order to have them with their father?

19

MR. CASTELLANO:

Because if she abides by that, the

20

provision in the Utah order that directs the kids to be with

21

the father, during visitation, there's a risk of harm based

22

on Dr. Cole's recommendation.

23
24
25

THE COURT:

Dr. Cole recommends supervised visitation

with the father?
MR. CASTELLANO:

That's all we are asking for,

26

pending her reasonable opportunity to go to Utah to resolve

27

this conflict in the order.

28

THE COURT:

Ms. Dichter, what's going on?
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3
1

M S . DICHTER:

2

U C C J A for a r e a s o n .

3

here.

4
5

I t ' s to a v o i d e x a c t l y w h a t ' s h a p p e n e d

Utah on August 11.
THE COURT:

7

M S . DICHTER:

Right.

A n d the m o t h e r w a s a n o - s h o w .

O n A u g u s t 9 -- W e h a v e t o b a c k up in

o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t ' s r e a l l y h a p p e n i n g h e r e .

9
10

A l l 50 s t a t e s h a v e enacted the

T h e r e w a s a h e a r i n g s c h e d u l e d in t h e State of

6

8

Okay.

O n A u g u s t 9, t h e y came into c o u r t e x p a r t e
a s k i n g for e m e r g e n c y j u r i s d i c t i o n , w h i c h w a s d e n i e d .

11

O n A u g u s t 1 1 , U t a h h e l d a h e a r i n g in w h i c h she

12

w a s found in d i r e c t c o n t e m p t of that c o u r t , a n d it issued a n

13

o r d e r signed o n A u g u s t 1 2 t h .

14

The children have then disappeared.

15

essence, they have been kidnaped.

16

h a v e them.

17

In

That is w h y D a d does not

M o m d i d n o t h i n g b e t w e e n A u g u s t 12 a n d

18

September the 1st.

19

is a b s u r d .

20

S o t o s a y she w a s w a i t i n g for D r . Cole

She d i d n o t h i n g .
N o w , t h e r e is a U t a h court h e a r i n g p e n d i n g o n

21

October 13th.

22

c o m p l i a n c e , a f t e r w h i c h t h e y intend t o s e n t e n c e h e r .

23

h a s b e e n h e l d in c o n t e m p t of c o u r t .

24

T h e y g a v e h e r 60 d a y s t o g e t h e r s e l f in
She

In the California statutory scheme, assuming it

25

were even here, once she is held in contempt, this court

26

w i l l n o t issue a f f i r m a t i v e relief u n t i l she is in

27

compliance.

28

b e in c o n t e m p t , a n d s h e is n o t e n t i t l e d t o a f f i r m a t i v e

So e v e n if w e w e r e in C a l i f o r n i a , she w o u l d n o w
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1

relief.

2

There's a very, very limited, limited exception

3

in the UCCJA.

4

the children, this court can make the barest amount of order

5

it deems necessary to protect the children.

6

It says if there is extreme impending harm to

The problem here is, if you read Dr. Cole's

7

letter --By the way, I don't think it's a recommendation.

8

Dr. Cole could have only seen these children under the

9

operative court order, Utah court order.

10
11

If anything, that

directs us to Utah, not California.
The other little glitch here, Dr. Cole was

12

given a vacated California court order.

Mr. Ross, who

13

represents Mom, Petitioner, here, on August 9, the Court

14

denied all ex parte relief.

15

On August 19th, out of the blue, no notice to

16

anyone, a court order issues staying all of Utah's action.

17

By about August 22nd -- That was in the State

18

of Utah, but never served on anyone else.

19

how this order came to be.

20

counsel, who appeared because I was out of town on the 9th.

21

No one else knows

It got served on Dad and on his

It gets served on Dad and his counsel, Jim

22

Eliaser, and Mr. Eliaser immediately faxes to

23

Commissioner Pattie the two inconsistent orders, saying,

24

"What's going on?"

25

has done for three years now, three years for custody

26

litigation resulting in a contempt and a turnover order.

27

So now what happens is, Commissioner Pattie

28

vacates that order.

Because that destroys everything Utah

He vacates it on the 26th.
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Jim Cole

5
1

gets it on the 1st.

2

report, you can see he's heavily relying upon it, and he's

3

very confused as to his status.

4

And if you read the first page of his

He never sees Mr. Barton.

There's nothing in

5

his letter indicating that Dad is physically abusive or even

6

really emotionally abusive.

7

There's no emergency.

8
9

THE COURT:

No harm to the kids.

All of that being said, have the children

started school?

10

MR. CASTELLANO:

11

Honor, is that --

12

THE COURT:

13

The kids say he yells too much.

No.

That's the problem here, your

Sounds like there's more than that

problem, but --

14

MR. CASTELLANO:

Well, the problem is, there's a Utah

15

order in effect that gives Mr. Barton visitation, and it

16

doesn't say anything about Dr. Cole's recommendations.

17

just instructs Mrs. Barton to go seek an interview with

18

Dr. Cole.

19

It

Mr. Barton has gone to the two schools that the

20

children are supposed to enroll in, and he's provided the

21

Utah order to the school.

22

What we are afraid of is that he's going to go

23

take the children away from the school under that provision

24

of the order and take them to Utah, while the school doesn't

25

have --

26

THE COURT:

Well, there's three minors?

27

MR. CASTELLANO:

28

THE COURT:

Right.

Do they all go to the same school?
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1
2

MR. CASTELLANO:

MS. DICHTER:

The oldest goes to Los Cerritos.

THE COURT:

6

MR. CASTELLANO:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. CASTELLANO:

What elementary?

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. DICHTER:

13

THE COURT:

14

MS. DICHTER:

17
18
19

Right.

They are both in Thousand

Oaks.
MS. DICHTER:

16

It's --

If it's Los Cerritos, it's in T.O.

10

15

The

other two go to elementary.

5

9

In the

declaration --

3
4

Two go to one.

Your Honor -Hang on.
Okay.

I just don't want to get --

Lang Ranch.
Lang Ranch.

That's it.

I just don't want to get distracted.
THE COURT:

I don't want to get distracted.

The two oldest to Los Cerritos.

Hang on.

The youngest

to Lange Ranch.
When did school start?

20

MR. CASTELLANO:

21

MS. DICHTER:

22

THE COURT:

Started on September 1st.

It started -So we have got - - w e have got a lawful

23

Utah order which says that these children are to be with

24

their dad until -- What is it?

25

MS. DICHTER:

26

MR. CASTELLANO:

27

THE COURT:

28

September what?

13.
13th.

And we also have their school.

Both Petitioner and Respondent live locally;
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1

right?

2

MS. DICHTER:

Respondent is a consultant.

He is

.3

presently under a long-term contract in Thousand Oaks, which

4

is all within the last -- since March.

5

previously in long-term contracts in other states.

6

home base is Utah.

7
8
9

MR. CASTELLANO:

He was

His

He's had an apartment in Ventura

County.
THE COURT:

He's residing in Thousand Oaks right now?

10

MS. DICHTER:

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. DICHTER:

13

Very recent.

Correct.
Okay.
He is not residing.

The answer is,

your Honor -- Got to be very careful --

14

THE COURT:

Domiciling?

15

MS. DICHTER:

Not domiciling either.

16

He is maintaining an apartment here.

17

While he has a home in Utah, he obviously has

18

to have a place to live that doesn't cost as much as a hotel

19

would cost on a long-term contract.

20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

So we have the kids in school.

They are

supposed to be with this dad.
What's the problem with that?
MR. CASTELLANO:

The problem is Dr. Cole has

recommended -THE COURT:

Right.

But you have to have the

26

mediator's -- you have to have the special master's report.

27

It has to come to hearing with respect to the appropriate --

28

Well, first of all, there's a jurisdictional issue.
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1

But even if California were to -- even if there

2

were communication between the two courts, allowing

3

California to begin to handle custody and visitation issues,

4

you don't just say, "I'm relying on a report," and just take

5

the kids.

6
7

That's not appropriate, is it?
MR. CASTELLANO:

Well, based on Dr. - - D r . Cole says

8

that the kids are quite fearful.

9

question --

10

THE COURT:

Well, right.

11

says at this point.

12

the Court.

13
14
15

There's a serious

I don't care what Dr. Cole

I care what is the existent order of

You don't unilaterally act without an order of
the Court, do you?

Or do you?

MR. CASTELLANO:

To the extent the Court orders,

16

directs the parties to seek Dr. Cole's counseling on the

17

disputed custody issues, that is part of the order.

18
19

THE COURT:

But it doesn't say Dr. Cole can issue

court orders that supersede the existing orders, does it?

20

MR. CASTELLANO:

21

THE COURT:

That's right, your Honor.

If Dr. Cole says the kids should never

22

see Dad again, that's not self -- that's not - - i t requires

23

a hearing of some sort, doesn't it, Counsel?

24

MR. CASTELLANO:

Well, it, I think, provides a

25

sufficient basis to protect the children pending that

26

hearing, if Dr. Cole is saying that these kids fear -- are

27

quite fearful of their father.

28

I'm not saying that there should be a reversal
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9
1

of custody right now.

2

recommendation pending her ability to go to Utah to resolve

.3

this conflict.

4

THE COURT:

I'm just saying, just preserve that

It sounds to me like there's a lawful

5

Utah order in effect, which gives Mr. Barton -- I don't know

6

if it's visitation or joint custody during this period of

7

time until September 13.

8
9
10

In terms of the best interest of the minors,
obviously, they need to stay in school.

They can't be

spirited out of the jurisdiction to Utah.

11

But other than the fact that -- other than when

12

they are in school, why shouldn't Dad have custody and/or

13

physical custody and/or visitation until you have your

14

hearing before Commissioner Pattie on the 13th?

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

MR. CASTELLANO:

Well, because Dr. Cole feels that

they are -THE COURT:

Is there anything in Dr. Cole's report

that suggests there's some emergency?
MR. CASTELLANO:
quite fearful.

I mean, he says that they are all

There's no relationship of trust.

THE COURT:

Right.

But what precipitates that?

22

We don't know that at this point.

23

Is the mom telling the kids, "Hey, your dad is

24
25
26
27
28

going to do X, Y, Z"?
I mean, there really isn't -- This is a very,
very brief report.

What is it?

Three pages?

And I don't think it's appropriate for the
petitioner, unilaterally, to be flagrantly violating Utah
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1

court orders because the court-ordered special master has

2

concerns about the temperament of the father.

3

needs to be addressed at a judicial hearing.

4
5

So, Ms. Dichter, do you have any other
comments?

6

MS. DICHTER:

7

THE COURT:

8
9

I think that

No.

That's -- That's just --

It sounds to me like these kids need to

be going to school, and there needs to be an order.
If there's a concern about these children being

10

spirited out of the state pending -- you know, for the next

11

six days, that they be ordered to attend their school here

12

in California, but, otherwise, visitation and custody is

13

with the father.

14

Right?

15

MS. DICHTER:

16

The answer is yes.

And if I were in a position to stipulate

17

without destroying my special appearance here, father would

18

only pick them up, take them to school.

19

He has no intention of going anywhere, nor has he.

20

His work is here.

Despite the fact, by the way, he has this court

21

order, when he did attempt to find the children, he brought

22

police officers with him.

23

anything that would embarrass his children.

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. DICHTER:

26

THE COURT:

27
28

He has made no effort to do

Is Mr. Barton here?
Yes.
Mr. Barton, please step forward.

And this is without your concession to this
Court's jurisdiction, because I don't want you to have to
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1

concede that, because that remains to be heard for another

2

day.

3

But you have no intention of taking these kids

4

outside the jurisdiction?

5

MR. BARTON:

6

THE COURT:

7

No.
And you will see to it that they attend

their respective schools --

8

MR. BARTON:

Absolutely.

9

THE COURT:

-- until the 13th?

10

MR. BARTON:

Yes.

11

THE COURT:

I mean, I don't see any reason why we

12

need to interfere with the lawful order of the Utah court at

13

this point.

14

The matter is set for September 13th on a

15

plenary hearing before Commissioner Pattie on all kinds of

16

issues.

17

I'm sure Commissioner Pattie can get into the

18

how's, when's and why's of visitation, whether it needs to

19

be supervised or otherwise.

20
21
22
23
24

Sounds like Mr. Barton needs to trust Dr. Cole
to provide his perspective, if that hasn't been done yet.
MR. CASTELLANO:

It has, your Honor.

He's met with Dr. Cole.
MS. DICHTER:

Actually, he met with Dr. Cole in May

25

when he was seeing his children regularly, and Dr. Cole left

26

town the moment he issued this letter, and wouldn't be back

27

until tomorrow.

28

So he hasn't had an opportunity to discuss this
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1

already.

2

THE COURT:

Well, Dr. Cole's report is a

3

recommendation to a court which is not self-enabling in and

4

of itself.

5

Dr. Cole's report is not before this court

6

today.

7

the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, and I'm not

8

inclined to do so.

9

It's an emergency request that the Court act under

I will state that, to the extent this court has

10

jurisdiction, it orders Mrs. Barton to turn over the

11

children, so that Mr. Barton can have his court-ordered

12

custody and visitation through the remainder of this

13

purported four-week visitation, which is September 13.

14

And Mr. Barton has been here.

15

won't remove them from the jurisdiction.

16

take them to school.

17

He's agreed he

He is going to

So we will comply with the existing orders and

18

have this matter heard on the 13th before

19

Commissioner Pattie on the various other issues.

20

MS. DICHTER:

21

MR. CASTELLANO:

22

MR. BARTON:

23

THE COURT:

24

MS. DICHTER:

25

THE COURT:

26

MR. CASTELLANO:

27
28

Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you, your Honor.

Thank you.
So the ex parte application is denied.
Thank you.

Any question as to what I just ruled?
Well, so there will be a plenary

hearing as to the emergency nature of this on the 13th?
THE COURT:

This was denied.

You will have your
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1

hearing on the 13th, which was noticed some time ago.

2

MR. CASTELLANO:

3

MS. DICHTER:

4

THE COURT:

Right.

That is correct.
And I see moving and opposing papers

5

filed by the parties, but I think you would -- you would

6

behoove your client to immediately turn the kids over to

7

their father, because there's a lawful court order which

8

compels that, and I don't think you want to continue to be

9

in violation of a lawful order.

10

I think the Utah court has jurisdiction at this

11

point.

12

California is going to step forward and take primary

13

responsibility is a different question.

14

contempt powers, and I think it's incumbent on your client

15

to recognize that.

16

Utah, she ought to think about that.

17

Whether we have concurrent jurisdiction or whether

But they also have

If she doesn't want to go to jail in

Okay?

18

MR. CASTELLANO:

19

MS. DICHTER:

20

MR. CASTELLANO:

21

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Thank you.
Thank you.

Thank you.

22
23

(Proceedings concluded.)

24
25

--00O00--

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

)
ss .

COUNTY OF VENTURA

I, Gina M. Currie, CSR 8429, Certified
Shorthand Reporter of the State of California, for the
County of Ventura, do hereby certify that the foregoing
pages, numbered 1 through 13, inclusive, are a true and
correct transcript of the proceedings held on Tuesday,
September 7, 1999, in the above-entitled cause.
Dated at Ventura, California, this 16th day of
May, 2000.

GINA'M. CURRIE, C&E/842 9
Official Court Reporter

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appendix "C"
Order on Order to Show Cause and Judgement, entered Aug. 12,1999
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FRED £ - ' < ? ' ? ?
Fourth Judicial District Court of
Wasatch County, State of Utah
CARMA_a. SMITH, Clerk
^
Deputy

DANAD. BURROWS - 5045
Attorney for Respondent
1149 West Center
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700

•tr-

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RHONDA LYNN CAMERON,
BARTON,
Petitioner,

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
AND JUDGEMENT

vs.
JOHN KIMBALL BARTON,
Respondent.

Civil No. 954400090
Judge Lynn Davis

The above-entitled matter having come before the court for Order to Show Cause in Re
Contempt on Wednesday, August 11,1999, before the Honorable Judge Lynn Davis. The Petitioner
was not present nor was the Petitioner represented by counsel. The Respondent was present and
represented by counsel, Dana D. Burrows. The court having reviewed the matter and being fully
advised in the premises, now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Petitioner was personally and properly served with the Motion, Affidavit and Order to Show
Cause andfiledan Affidavit in Response to Respondent's Order to Show Cause Re Contempt
but failed to personally appear or through counsel.

2.

The courtfindsthat the Petitioner had an obligation to appear in court in person regardless
of whether the Petitioner felt that the Fourth District Court of Wasatch County, State of Utah
has jurisdiction over the action or not since the Decree of Divorce and the Addendum to
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shall be heard in Provo, Utah regardless of who requests the hearing, if in fact the Respondent
so desires said hearing to occur in Provo, Utah.
The Petitioner shall immediately contact the Special Master, Dr. Cole, and shall immediately
schedule an appointment and make arrangements to meet with Dr. Cole and to address the
issues raised by the Respondent and set forth in the Addendum to Decree of Divorce entered
by the court on December 22, 1998 and attempt to resolve said issues promptly and in good
faith.
Petitioner shall immediately reimburse the Respondent for the judgement amount as set forth
in paragraph 3 above and shall further cooperate with the Respondent's makeup and extended
visitation as outlined in paragraph 5 above and cooperate by contacting and cooperating with
the Special Master as set forth in paragraph 7 above, all of which are part of the Finding of
Contempt. The court will reserve implementation of penalty or incarceration pending a
review hearing to determine the Petitioner's compliance with the terms and conditions of this
order which review hearing shall occur 60 days or morefromAugust 11, 1999 to enable the
Petitioner sufficient time to comply with the court order regarding payment of the judgement
as well as Make Up and Extended Visitation and cooperation with the Special Master. The
review hearing will not be scheduled but can be noticed up which notice may be served upon
the Petitioner by mailing to the Petitioner's last known address.
DATED for this ^

day of August, 1999.

JfUl^ELYNN'DAVIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
3
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Appendix "DM
Order for Sanctions, entered Nov. 5, 1999
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DANAD. BURROWS - 5045
Attorney for Respondent
1149 West Center
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700

Mff\

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RHONDA LYNN CAMERON,
BARTON,
Petitioner,

ORDER FOR SANCTIONS

vs.
JOHN KIMBALL BARTON,

Civil No. 954400090

Respondent.

Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr.

The above-entitled matter having come before the court for Review Hearing before the
Honorable Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr., on Monday, October 18, 1999, on what sanctions to impose
against the Petitioner based upon thefindingof contempt entered by the court in the Order on Order
to Show Cause and Judgment on August 12, 1999. Petitioner was present and represented by
counsel Don Petersen. Respondent was present and represented by counsel Dana D. Burrows. The
court having heard testimony of both parties as witnesses and being fully advised in the premises,
now, therefore, the court hereby enters its Findings and Order:
1.

The court finds that the Petitioner has continued in her ongoing willful and intentional
disregard of the order of the court of August 12,1999 especially as it relates to the issue of
ongoing and makeup visitation.

2.

The Petitioner shall be sentenced to two (2) days in jail at the Utah County Jail with said
sentence to commence immediately.
1
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J
DATED this 2 . 2 - ^ day of October, 1999.

DANA D. BURROWS
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
j

I hereby certify that on this ~&- ~ day of October, 1999,1 mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Order and Judgment, postage prepaid, to the following:
Don R. Petersen
120E300N
PO Box 1248
ProvoUT 84603

DANA D. BURROWS
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